Following the events of 9/11/2001 in the US, the world public awareness to possible terrorist attacks on water supply systems has increased significantly. The security of drinking water distribution systems has become a foremost concern around the globe. Water distribution systems are spatially diverse and thus are inherently vulnerable to intentional contamination intrusions. In this study, a multiobjective optimization evolutionary model for enhancing the response against deliberate contamination intrusions into water distribution systems is developed and demonstrated. Two conflicting objectives are explored: (1) minimization of the contaminant mass consumed following detection, versus (2) minimization of the number of operational activities required to contain and flush the contaminant out of the system (i.e. number of valves closure and hydrants opening). Such a model is aimed at directing quantitative response actions in opposition to the conservative approach of entire shutdown of the system until flushing and cleaning is completed. The developed model employs the multiobjective Non-Dominated Sorted Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) scheme, and is demonstrated using two example applications.
.
Once monitoring stations are in place, a complimentary model should provide the ability to solve the contamination source identification problem of revealing the characteristics of a contaminant intrusion: its location, starting time, injection duration and mass rate. This is essential for implementing a response model for recovering the system after a contamination intrusion, which is the subject of this manuscript. Shang et al. (2002) suggested an input-output model which provides information about the relationships between water quality at input and output locations by tracking water parcels and moving them simultaneously along their paths. (2) a genetic algorithm (Holland 1975 ) EPANET (USEPA 2002) framework (Preis & Ostfeld 2006b ).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Response modeling for optimizing activities after a contamination event is at its infancy. Poulin et al. (2006) introduced an algorithm based on a set of heuristic operational and safety rules to isolate contaminated zones, to (1) minimize the risk that contaminated water is consumed;
(2) identify network valves to be closed to safely 
PROBLEM FORMULATION
The effort in this study is to quantitatively model the series of actions required after a contamination intrusion detection for recovering a water distribution system to normal operation. Such actions are aimed at both minimizing the contamination exposure to public and the number of the required field operations (i.e. valves closure and hydrants flushing). These two objectives are provided below.
Consumed contamination mass F 1 F 1 is defined as the total contamination mass consumed following detection:
where i is node index, N is total number of consumer nodes, t is elapsed time from first detection time t d , EPS (Extended Period Simulation) is overall simulation duration, c i (t) is contaminant concentration at node i at time t and V i (t) is volume of consumed water at node i at time t. Number of field operations F 2 F 2 is the total number of field operations (i.e. valves closure and hydrants opening) needed for isolation and flushing of the contamination out of the system:
where k is valves index, VA is total number of valves (VA k has the value of 1 if the kth valve was closed for isolation and 0 otherwise), j is hydrant index, HY is total number of hydrants (HY j has the value of 1 if the jth hydrant was opened for flushing and 0 otherwise).
Obviously as F 2 increases, F 1 decreases; F 2 and F 1 therefore compete.
MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION
Multiobjective optimization deals with finding the vector of decision variables which satisfy a set of constraints and optimizes a vector function whose elements represent the objective functions. Consequently, a multiobjective optimization problem can be formalized as follows.
Optimize
where k and l are inequality and equality constraints, respectively, and x ¼ (x 1 ,x 2 , … ,x n ) T is the vector of decision variables.
The goal in multiobjective optimization is to find from all the sets of solutions which satisfy Equations (4) and (5) the set of solutions which yield optimal values with respect to all the objective functions. This set of solutions is called the Pareto optimal solution set or the non-dominated solution set. Each solution x in the Pareto optimal set is optimal in the sense that it is not possible to improve one objective without making at least one of the others worse.
Any two solutions x (1) and x (2) are compared based on domination, where a solution x (1) is said to dominate x (2) if the following conditions hold:
1. x (1) is no worse than x (2) in all objectives:
2.
x (1) is strictly better than x (2) in at least one objective:
where N indicates a better performance evaluation of an objective function and M is the number of objective functions.
There are two interconnected conceptual goals in multiobjective optimization: to find a set of solutions as close as possible to the Pareto optimal set and to guarantee that the set of solutions is as diverse as possible.
In recent years, several methods have been developed for multiobjective optimization with the emphasis on extending single evolutionary optimization methods such as genetic algorithms to multiobjective evolutionary methodologies. Three of the most popular implemented algorithms are: multiobjective genetic algorithm (MOGA) (Fonseca & Fleming 1995) , the non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA II) (Deb et al. 2000) , and the strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm II (SPEA II) (Zitzler et al. 2001) .
In water distribution systems, management multiobjec- 
EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS
The methodology is demonstrated on two example applications: (1) The pollution scenario imposed for testing the methodology is an intrusion at node 101 at 08:00 of a contaminant with a mass rate of 0.00467 kg/sec for a duration of 6 h. As a The Pareto optimal front of the consumed contamination mass (F 1 ) versus the number of field operations (F 2 ) is shown in Figure 3 .
It can be seen from Figure 3 Four sensitivity analyses (SA) were conducted for this example, each altering one of the genetic algorithm parameters. In SA1, the population was increased to 48 (24 at the base run). As a result, a slightly better Pareto front was obtained but the computational time was increased relative to the increase in the number of generations. The same result was obtained for SA2 at which the number of generations was increased to 60 (30 at the base run). In SA3, the crossover probability was altered to 0.85 (0.75 at the base run), and in SA4 the mutation probability was increased to 0.15 (0.07 at the base run). The outcomes for both SA3 and SA4 have not shown a substantial influence on the algorithm performance.
From this, it can be concluded that the most dominant GA parameters were the population size and the number of generations with the crossover and mutation probabilities affecting the algorithm convergence less. However, the increase in both population size and generation number, which increased the computational time significantly, did not result in improved Pareto fronts. As a result of the intrusion, the sensor located at node 31 detected the contaminant existence at 08:24. After the first detection, it is assumed that the system response time for initiating actions for handling the event is 1 h. Protective response actions therefore began at 09:24.
The probabilities of crossover and mutation were set equal to 0.75 and 0.07, respectively. The NSGA-II population consisted of 24 chromosomes, and the total number of generation was set to 30. Average running time on an IBM 3.6 GHz, 1 GB of RAM was about 15 min.
The Pareto optimal front of the consumed contamination mass (F 1 ) versus the number of field operations (F 2 ) is shown in Figure 6 . 
CONCLUSIONS
Response modeling for contamination intrusions is in its early research stages. This study developed and demonstrated a multiobjective model for enhancing the response to a contamination event. The NSGA-II was implemented to tradeoff the contamination exposure to public versus the number of field operations required to recover the system to its normal state. Such a model can provide a tool to allow decision-makers to react quantitatively to a contamination event, as opposed to immediately shutting down the entire system.
Research is being conducted into implementation of the methodology to larger water distribution systems, the reduction of the computational time required for solving the problem and into incorporation of uncertainty in both the ability of sensors to detect contaminants and in the system data (e.g. distribution of flows, pressures).
